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A rule for setting a tax on carbon emissions to limit their atmospheric stock to a 
predetermined level is developed for a world inhabited by uncoordinated, myopic, 
expected utility maximizing agents. In all locations, the mean of the marginal product 
of the carbon emitting input diminishes and the variance increases as climate 
deteriorates. The rule is illustrated for a world divided into poor countries and rich 
countries. The poor countries’ costs of non-compliance with the tax, in terms of per 
capita utility loss from diminished reputation, are negligible. The rich countries' costs 
of non-compliance and, consequently, inclination to pay the globally set tax can be 
substantial but not identical. The number of complying rich countries decreases with 
the tax level, but at a rate that is moderated by the range of the rich countries’ loss of 
per capita utility from abstinence.   
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1. Introduction 
The atmosphere is an indivisible, open access, essential natural resource. In the 
absence of property rights, private formation of markets for the externalities created 
by polluting emissions into this natural resource, climate change in particular, is 
impossible. The policy measures for controlling polluting emissions are classified as 
quantity-based instruments and price-based instruments. Theoretical comparisons of 
these instruments have followed Weitzman’s (1974) analysis of stock-based 
externalities. Within a general stochastic benefit-cost framework, his analysis has led 
to the proposition that price control is superior (inferior) to quantity control if, and 
only if, the sum of the curvature of the cost curve and the curvature of the benefit 
curve is positive (negative) around the optimal output, and that the efficiency gap 
between the said instruments is intensified by the variance of the slope of the benefit 
curve. In the context of greenhouse-gas emissions, Pizer (2002), Hoel and Karp 
(2002), Newell and Pizer, (2003) and Fischer and Newell (2008) have provided 
arguments in favour of price-based instruments.  
A tax on greenhouse-gas emissions has been implemented by a small number 
of rich nations including Scandinavian and North European countries, Canada, New 
Zealand and, most recently, Australia. Levy’s (2011) conceptual analysis of the 
effects of abstaining rich and poor countries’ free-riding, overstated expectations and 
guilt on the efficiency of carbon tax implemented by a group of willing rich countries 
has led to the proposition that a one-sided implementation of a tax on greenhouse-gas 
emissions does not necessarily reduce global emissions. Nor does it necessarily 
reduce the tax-paying group’s emissions when the members’ utilities are directly 
affected by the engendered environmental damage. In view of this proposition and the 
indivisibility of the atmosphere, and consistent with the catastrophe-avoidance 
argument for capping the concentration of greenhouse gases at 450 particles per 
million (in order to limit global warming to 2º Celsius), this paper outlines a tax-based 
procedure for constraining the stock of greenhouse gases in a world inhabited by 
stakeholders facing different economic conditions with uncertainty intensified by 
climate change. To simplify the analysis the paper ignores the differences between the 
various greenhouse gases and refers to them as carbons. The analysis incorporates a 
global atmospheric stock target into the determination of a flat carbon tax for 
effectively moderating climate change. The incorporation takes into account that 
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countries cannot be forced to comply. The stakeholders are classified as poor, hence 
unable and/or unwilling to pay, countries and as rich countries with different costs of 
non-compliance.  
The outlining of the tax-based procedure for constraining the atmospheric 
carbon stock is based on five premises. The first one is that the controllable carbon 
emissions are a by-product of the production process of goods and services. The 
second premise is the existence of a climate-wise ideal concentration of carbons in the 
atmosphere. The larger the deviation from that ideal concentration is, the less 
favourable the climate and, in turn, the smaller the output mean and the larger the 
output variance. The third premise is that stakeholders are aware of these adverse 
effects of the deviations from the climate-wise ideal stock on their output and are risk 
averse and rational, but uncoordinated and myopic. Their carbon emissions are 
determined by a maximization of their individual expected periodical utility from 
their random net periodical revenues. The fourth premise is that the international 
planner takes into account the stakeholders’ expected periodical utility maximizing 
carbon emissions and the periodical changes in the natural environment’s absorptive 
capacity of carbons. In analogy to the common practice of central banks with regard 
to interest rate, the international planner sets the carbon tax at the beginning of each 
period at a level required for achieving an atmospheric carbon stock target. The fifth 
premise is that the stakeholders are sovereign countries in various stages of economic 
development. They have different ability and inclination to pay for carbon emissions. 
They cannot be forced to pay the carbon tax set by the international planner. Hence, 
the higher the tax level is the smaller the number of complying countries. Yet, 
potential loss of international reputation encourages compliance. 
Taking into account the first, second and third premises, section 2 derives the 
effect of a carbon tax on the emissions of the countries’ representative agents. With 
the fourth and fifth premises in mind, section 3 and 4 incorporate the agents’ expected 
utility maximizing carbon emissions into the formulation of the relationship between 
compliance and the carbon tax level and, subsequently, into the motion equation of 
the atmospheric carbon stock and the formulation of the periodical carbon tax rate 
required for limiting the atmospheric stock to a predetermined level with an allowance 
for a negative relationship between the number of complying countries and the tax 
level. Section 4 provides derives the stock-targeting carbon tax for a special case 
where countries are classified into two groups: poor countries with negligible loss of 
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per capita utility from non-compliance and rich countries with different levels of loss 
of per capita utility from non compliance. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Climate driven uncertainty and expected utility maximizing emissions  
Consider a world where the carbon emission of the representative agent (per capita 
carbon emission) of each country i 1, 2,3,..., N=  at period t, ite , is proportional to his 
use of energy, itc . That is, 
it i ite c= α                       (1) 
where the positive scalar iα  reflects the emission-intensity of country i’s 
representative agent’s energy consumption. The larger the proportion of “dirty” 
sources of energy (e.g., brown coal) and the less advanced the production technology 
are, the greater iα . The goods and services produced by the representative agent’s 
energy consumption at period t is represented by a composite output, ity . The 
composite output is, for tractability, proportional to the energy consumption, but 
uncertain:  
it it it ity (a )c= + ε .                    (2) 
The scalar ita  is positive and represents the expected marginal product of energy in 
country i. It is assumed to diminish with the deterioration of the climate engendered 
by the divergence of the current stock of carbons in the atmosphere from the climate-
wise ideal level. The additional factor, itε , is a zero-mean normally distributed 
random deviation from this expected marginal product caused by random disturbances 
in the representative agent’s production environment. That is, 2it it(0, )ε σ N . It is 
assumed that 2itσ  is finite, but increases with the deterioration of the climate caused by 
an increasing deviation from the ideal atmospheric carbon stock.  
As countries do not have identical location and topography (and, 
consequently, exposure to the sun and oceans), the ideal atmospheric carbon stock is 
country-specific. Consistent with the said assumptions, country i’s ideal atmospheric 
carbon stock is defined as the stock level associated with both the smallest marginal 
product’s variance, 2iσ , and the largest expected marginal product, ia , of energy for 
its representative agent. With t 1S −  denoting the atmospheric carbon stock at the 
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beginning of period t, oiS  the ideal stock, and i 0β >  the sensitivity of country i’s 
marginal product’s variance to climate change, the variance of country i’s 
representative agent’s marginal product at t is expressed as: 
2 2 o 2
it i i t 1 i[1 (S S ) ]−σ = σ +β − .                   (3) 
The representative agent’s expected marginal product of energy decreases from the 
maximum level, ia , with the deviation of the actual atmospheric carbon stock from 
the ideal stock. This assumption is formally represented by 
o 2
it i i t 1 ia a / [1 (S S ) ]−= + γ −          (4) 
where i 0γ >  reflects the sensitivity of country i’s representative agent’s expected 
marginal product to climate change. 
As it i ite c= α  implies that it it ic e /= α , country i’s representative agent’s 
production function can be portrayed as: 
i
it it i ito 2
i i t 1 i
ay ( / ) e
[1 (S S ) ]−
 
= + ε α α + γ − 
.       (5) 
With the price of energy for country i’s representative agent at t being equal to itq , 
the imputed price of his carbon emissions before tax is it iq / α . With the price of his 
composite output at t being equal to itp  and with his carbon tax rate being equal to 
it 0τ ≥ , the net revenue of country i’s representative agent at t is:  
i
it it it i it it i it ito 2
i i t 1 i
ap ( / ) e [(q / ) ]e
[1 (S S ) ]−
 
π = + ε α − α + τ α + γ − 
.   (6) 
This net revenue is normally distributed with  
it i
it it i it ito 2
i i t 1 i
p aE( ) (q / ) e
[1 (S S ) ]−
 
π = − α − τ α + γ − 
      (7) 
and 
2 2 o 2 2 2
it it i i t 1 i i itVAR( ) {p [1 (S S ) ] / }e−π = σ +β − α .       (8) 
Country i’s representative agent derives utility from his net revenue. For 
tractability, his utility function is taken to be negative exponential, 
it i itu 1 exp( R )= − − π . In which case his expected utility can be expressed as 
it it iEu 1 m( R )= − π −          (9) 
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where m is the moment generating function of itπ  and iR 0>  the representative 
agent’s degree of absolute risk aversion.1
it
it
iV0.5R(u ) 1 e−Ε = −
 It is postulated that each country’s 
representative agent is myopically rational – at the beginning of every period t he 
chooses a carbon emission level that maximizes his current expected utility per se. 
With a normally distributed net revenue, his current expected utility function can be 
further expressed as 
                           (10) 
where it it i itV E( ) 0.5R VAR( )= π − π .  
As 2 2 o 2 2i it i i t 1 i iR {p [1 (S S ) ] / } 0−− σ +β − α < , the second-order condition for 
maximum expected utility is satisfied. In consideration of (7) and (8), the expected 
utility maximizing emission level, *ite , for a given carbon tax rate, itτ , should satisfy 
the following condition: 
2 2 o 2 2 *it i
it i it i it i i t 1 i i ito 2
i i t 1 i
p a (q / ) R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }e 0.
[1 (S S ) ] −−
− α − τ − σ +β − α =
α + γ −
            (11) 
Consequently, the expected utility maximizing carbon emission level in period t for 
the representative agent of country i is equal to the ratio of his climate-change eroded 
expected marginal net revenue to his climate-change intensified marginal cost of risk-
bearing: 
it i
it i ito 2
* i i t 1 i
it 2 2 o 2 2
i it i i t 1 i i
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]e
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
− α − τ
α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
.                         (12) 
 
3. Compliance, abstinence and stock-targeting carbon tax 
In analogy to the practice of central banks with regard to controlling inflation by 
periodical interest-rate adjustments, the proposed control scheme is based on a flat 
uniform tax on carbon emissions, tτ̂ , set at the beginning of each period by an 
international planner at a rate required for achieving an atmospheric carbon stock 
target, tŜ . The setting of the tax takes into account that compliance is not universal. 
Non-compliance generates different levels of loss of international reputation for 
                                                 
1 See Freund (1956) for original suggestion and Hammond (1974) for the generality of this 
simplification. 
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countries. The consideration of potential loss of international reputation provides a 
rationale for the practicality of an internationally set tax on carbon emissions.  
It is beneficial for country i to comply as long as the carbon tax is lower than a 
threshold level, itτ . At this threshold level, country i’s representative agent’s 
maximum expected utility under compliance is equal to his maximum expected utility 
under abstinence ( it 0τ = ). That is, 
* *
i it it it it i it it it it itEu ( (e ( ), )) Eu ( (e ( 0), 0))π τ τ = π τ = τ = −ψ                 (13) 
where it 0ψ ≥  is the current loss of per capita utility for country i from diminished 
international reputation. Recalling (10) and using the envelope theorem,2
i i
*
*i i it it it
i it
it
*
it it it0.5R V (e ( ), )Eu ( (e ( ), )) 0.5R e 0.e− τ τ∂ π τ τ = − <
∂τ
 the 
representative agent’s maximum expected utility decreases with the carbon tax rate:  
                       (14) 
In conjunction with equality (13), *i i it it it itEu ( (e ( ), )) / 0∂ π τ τ ∂τ <  implies that 
it itd / d 0τ ψ >  and 
it
it0
lim 0
ψ →
τ = .  
The global planner is assumed to have perfect information about each 
country’s technology, vulnerability to climate change, degree of risk aversion, and 
potential loss from non compliance and about the natural depletion rate of 
atmospheric carbon stock. In setting the periodical carbon tax he takes into account 
the countries’ decisions on compliance and, subsequently, emissions. In conjunction 
with (12), his chosen tτ̂  satisfies: 
c c c nc nc nc
c nc c
N N
* *
t i i t i t t i i t i t t t 1
i 1 i i
ˆ ˆS L e ( ) L e ( 0) (1 )S −
= ≠
= τ = τ + τ = + −δ∑ ∑ .                         (15) 
In this equality, the countries indicated by ci  pay the globally set carbon tax as their 
threshold levels are larger than the carbon tax set by the global planner (i.e., 
ci t t
ˆτ > τ ). 
The countries indicated by nci  do not comply as the carbon tax set by the global 
planner exceeds their threshold levels (i.e., 
nci t t
ˆτ < τ ). 
ci
L  and 
nci
L  denote the 
populations of the complying countries and non-complying countries, respectively. 
                                                 
2 By differentiating (10) at the agent’s optimal emission level and considering the necessary condition, 
i i i i
* * * *
*i i it it it i it it it i it it it it
i i it
it it it it
0
* *
it it it it it it0.5R V (e ( ), ) 0.5R V (e ( ), )Eu ( (e ( ), )) V (e ( ), ) V ((e ( ), ) e0.5R 0.5R [ e ].
e
e e− τ τ − τ τ∂ π τ τ ∂ τ τ ∂ τ τ ∂= = − +
∂τ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ

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The parameter t0 1< δ <  denotes the natural depletion rate of atmospheric carbons 
through sinking into the Earth’s surface, dissemination into space and sequestration 
by plants. It varies with changes in the absorptive capacity of the oceans and plants, in 
particular. The following section provides an illustration and a close-form solution for 
the stock-targeting carbon tax in a world divided into a group of identical poor 
countries with negligible potential loss of expected utility from non-compliance and a 
group of technology, location and population wise identical rich countries but with 
varying potential loss of expected utility from non-compliance due to cultural and/or 
ideological differences.  
 
4. Illustration: Non-complying poor countries and some complying rich countries  
Consider a world with rN  rich (r) countries and p rN N N= −  poor (p) countries. The 
poor countries have the same technology, climate, prices of energy and composite 
output, and population size. The poor countries’ loss of per capita utility from 
abstinence from the internationally coordinated emission-control scheme is negligible 
( p 0ψ → ) due to their low level of per capita emissions and strong expectations of 
being excused or forgiven. The rich countries are also identical with regard to 
technology, climate, prices of energy and composite output, and population size. 
However, the rich countries do not have identical loss of per capita utility from 
reputation tarnished by abstinence. Due to cultural and/or ideological differences,3
max(0, )ψ
 
their levels of potential per capita utility loss form a continuum along a range 
.  
In view of the properties that it itd / d 0τ ψ >  and 
it
it0
lim 0
ψ →
τ = , the larger the loss 
of utility range (0, maxψ ) is, the smaller the adverse effect of a carbon-tax increment 
on the number of complying rich countries in period t ( rctN ). Furthermore, 
max
rc rlim N Nψ →∞ =  and max rc0
lim N 0
ψ →
= . These properties are reflected by the following 
explicit form:  
r
rct
max t
NN
1 ( / )
=
+ θ ψ τ
                             (16) 
                                                 
3 For example, see Berck and Helfand (2011) for a discussion on the effect of culture and ideology on 
the willingness of North Europeans, Scandinavians and Americans to pay emission tax. 
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where θ  is a positive scalar – the rich countries’ non-compliance coefficient. It is 
further assumed that the non-complying rich countries do not implement domestic 
emission-control schemes. With this relationship between compliance and carbon tax 
in mind, the international planner sets the periodical carbon-tax level so as to limit the 
stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the end of period t to a targeted level. 
To achieve a targeted atmospheric carbon stock, tŜ , the periodical carbon-tax 
level should satisfy the following equality: 
* * *
t rct r rct r rct r rat r p pt t t 1Ŝ N L e [N N ]L e (N N )L e (1 )S −= + − − − + −δ .                 (17) 
Recalling (12), the carbon emissions of the representative agent of a rich cooperative 
(rc) country are 
rt r
rt r to 2
* r r t 1 r
rct 2 2 o 2 2
r rt r r t 1 r r
p a ˆ(q / )
[1 (S S ) ]e
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
− α − τ
α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
                (18) 
the carbon emissions of the representative agent of a rich abstaining (ra) country are 
rt r
rt ro 2
* r r t 1 r
rat 2 2 o 2 2
r rt r r t 1 r r
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]e
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
− α
α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
                (19) 
and the carbon emissions of the representative agent of a poor country are 
pt p
pt po 2
p p t 1 p*
pt 2 2 o 2 2
p pt p p t 1 p p
p a
(q / )
[1 (S S ) ]
e
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
− α
α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
.                (20) 
By substituting (16), (18), (19) and (20) into (17), the stock-targeting carbon-tax level 
should satisfy: 
rt r
rt r to 2
r r t 1 rr
t r 2 2 o 2 2
max t r rt r r t 1 r r
rt r
rt ro 2
r r t 1 rr
r r 2 2 o 2 2
max t r rt r r t 1 r r
pt p
p
r p
p a ˆ(q / )
[1 (S S ) ]NŜ L
ˆ1 ( / ) R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]NN L
ˆ1 ( / ) R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
p a
[1
(N N )L
−
−
−
−
− α − τ
α + γ −
=
+ θ ψ τ σ +β − α
− α
  α + γ −
+ − + θ ψ τ σ +β − α 
α
+ −
pt po 2
p t 1 p
t t 12 2 o 2 2
p pt p p t 1 p p
(q / )
(S S ) ]
(1 )S .
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
−
− α
+ γ −
+ −δ
σ +β − α
                    (21) 
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By multiplying both sides of this equality by max tˆ[1 ( / ) ]+ θ ψ τ  and rearranging terms, 
the international planner’s rule for setting the atmospheric stock targeting carbon tax 
is: 
pt prt r
r p p pto 2r r r rto 2
p t 1 pr t 1 r
t t 12 2 o 2 2 2 o 2
r rt r r t 1 r p p t p p t 1 p
t t 1
t
t
t
max
p ap a (N N )L qN L q
[1 (S S ) ][1 (S S ) ]
Ŝ (1 )S
R p [1 (S S ) ] R p [1 (S S ) ]
ˆ[S (1 )S ]
ˆ
−−
−
− −
−
− α −α −
+ γ −+ γ −
+ − + − δ
σ +β − σ +β −
− − δ +
    
    
     
  
  
    τ =
θ
ψ
pt prt r
r p p ptr r r r rt o 2o 2
p t 1 pr t 1 r
2 2 o 2 2 2 o 2
r rt r r t 1 r p p t p p t 1 p
maxmax
p ap a (N N )L qN L q
[1 (S S ) ][1 (S S ) ]
R p [1 (S S ) ] R p [1 (S S ) ]
−−
− −
− α −α α − −
+ γ −+ γ −
−
σ +β − σ +β −
       θθ
       ψψ        
  
  
      
                                                                                                                                  .(22) 
An inspection of equation (22) reveals that the derived carbon tax decreases 
with the stock target, tŜ , with the stock’s natural depletion rate, tδ , and with the 
prices of energy in the rich countries and in the poor countries, rtq and ptq . The 
derived carbon tax rises with the expected marginal product of energy in the rich and 
the poor countries attainable under ideal climate, ra  and pa , with the emission-
intensities of the poor and rich countries’ energy consumption, pα  and rα , and with 
the abstaining poor countries’ population, r p(N N )L− . Despite the tax-increasing 
effect of the energy consumption’s emission-intensities, the carbon tax does not 
necessarily rise with the rich countries’ population, r rN L . It can decrease with the 
population of the rich countries when the value of the rich countries’ non-compliance 
coefficient (θ ) is sufficiently low and as their range of per capita utility loss from 
abstinence ( maxψ ) is sufficiently large, as the burden is shared by a sufficiently large 
number of complying rich countries.  
The inspection of equation (22) also reveals that the derived carbon tax 
decreases with the poor countries’ representative agents’ risk-bearing-cost coefficient, 
2 2 o 2
p pt p p t 1 pR p [1 (S S ) ]−σ +β − . More specifically, the carbon tax decreases with the poor 
countries’ degree of absolute risk aversion, pR , with the variance of their marginal 
output under ideal climate, 2pσ , and with the sensitivity of their marginal product’s 
variance to climate change, pβ . As only some of the rich countries comply, the rich 
countries’ representative agents’ risk-bearing-cost coefficient, 
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2 2 o 2
r rt r r t 1 rR p [1 (S S ) ]−σ +β − , does not necessarily reduce the carbon tax set by the 
international planner. It is only clear that the stock-targeting tax decreases with 
2 2 o 2
r rt r r t 1 rR p [1 (S S ) ]−σ +β −  when 
rt r
r rto 2
r t 1 rmax
p a
q
[1 (S S ) ]
0
−
α − −
+ γ −
 θ
< ψ  
. This property 
is supported by a large ratio of the non-compliance coefficient (θ ) to the range of the 
potential per capita utility loss from non-compliance ( maxψ ) in the group of rich 
countries, by a low emission-intensity of energy consumption in rich countries ( rα ), 
by a large maximum marginal expected marginal product of energy ( ra ) for rich 
countries, by a low sensitivity of rich countries’ expected marginal product to climate 
change ( rγ ), by a small deviation from the climate-wise ideal atmospheric stock of 
carbons for rich countries ( o 2t 1 r(S S )− − ), by a high price for rich countries’ composite 
output ( rtp ), and by a low energy price in rich countries ( rtq ).      
The inspection further suggests that the international planner’s carbon tax rises 
with both the rich and poor countries’ representative agents’ expected marginal profit 
coefficients o 2rt r r t 1 r rt{p a / [(1 (S S ) )] q }−+ γ − −  and 
o 2
pt p p t 1 p pt{p a / [1 (S S ) )] q }−+ γ − − , 
respectively, and in a rate intensified by the rich countries’ non-compliance 
coefficient (θ ) and moderated by the rich countries’ range of per capita utility loss 
from abstinence ( maxψ ). This property indicates that the international planner’s 
periodical carbon tax decreases with the rich and poor countries’ expected marginal 
product’ sensitivity to climate change, rγ  and pγ . In conjunction with the previously 
identified moderating effect of the poor countries’ risk-bearing-cost coefficient, this 
property also indicates that the carbon tax decreases with the deviation of the 
atmospheric carbon stock from the climate-wise ideal level for the poor countries, 
o 2
t 1 p(S S )− − . The direction of the overall effect of the deviation of the atmospheric 
carbon stock from the climate-wise ideal level for the rich countries, o 2t 1 p(S S )− − , on 
the international planner’s periodical carbon tax is not clear.  
Finally, as long as the carbon stock target is set below the actual initial stock 
minus its natural depletion during the period (i.e., t t t 1Ŝ (1 )S −< − δ ), the international 
planner’s periodical carbon tax rises with the rich countries’ non-compliance 
coefficient (θ ); whereas for t t t 1Ŝ (1 )S −>> − δ , the carbon tax can decrease with θ . 
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These effects are moderated by the rich countries’ range of utility loss from 
abstinence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper develops a rule for limiting the atmospheric carbon stock to a 
predetermined level in a world where climate change is driven by variation in this 
stock and where the deviations from the ideal stock diminish the mean and increase 
the variance of the marginal product of the carbon emissions’ source input. The 
derivation took into account that agents are aware of these adverse effects of the 
deviations from the climate-wise ideal stock on their output and maximize expected 
utility from the uncertain net revenues, that countries pay an internationally set carbon 
tax as long as their representative agents’ expected utility under compliance is at least 
as large as that under abstinence. Some countries are poor, hence unable and/or 
unwilling to pay carbon tax. Due to cultural and ideological differences the loss of 
utility from abstinence varies across rich countries and the number of the complying 
rich countries diminishes with the tax rate. For application, the stock-capping carbon 
tax rate can be numerically solved for the real case, where all the countries are 
different, with non-identical parameters. For illustration and qualitative analysis, the 
carbon tax rate was derived for the tractable case where the poor countries are 
identical, and so are also the rich countries, with the aforesaid exception of non-
identical culture and/or ideology.  
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